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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
NEW YORK'S CHANGING CONCEPT OF VESTED INTERESTS
IN REGARD TO SHAREHOLDERS
Introduction
In an early Court of Appeals case 1 it was said that in order to
increase the capital stock of a stock corporation, which increase pro-
vided for issue of preferred stock, it was necessary to have the con-
sent of all the common stock holders. Today such unanimous consent
is not required,2 and many other changes in the capital structure of
a corporation, by a vote of the holders of two-thirds or a majority of
the outstanding stock, are legal which fifty years ago any single
stockholder could have prevented by objecting on constitutional
grounds that he was being denied a property right without due proc-
ess of law, or that his contractual rights were impaired.
The present discussion will be limited to: (1) Rights which at
one time were not subject to alteration without the consent of the
stockholder himself, (2) the subsequent nullification of the view that
these rights were changeless, and (3) the present rights of a minor-
ity stockholder.
I
The Constitution of the United States declares that "no state
shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 3
In 1819 the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated Dart-
mouth College case 4 held that when the legislature of a state grants
a charter to a private corporation the charter constitutes a contract
between the state and the corporation. Although the doctrine has
been ". . . reaffirmed and applied so often as to have become firmly
established as a canon of American jurisprudence," 5 it was limited
from the moment of its inception by the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Story. He suggested that if a state desired to reserve the
right to alter or repeal a corporate charter it could do so by inserting
a clause to that effect in the charter itself.6 Since the decision such
reservation has become practically universal, the legislatures retain-
ing the right to alter, amend, or repeal through appropriate consti-
tutional or statutory enactment.7 "It is now settled that such a
'Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879).
2N. Y. STocx CORP. LAW § 37.
3 U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 10.4 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 463 (U. S.
1819).
5 Brown, J., in Pearsall v. Great Northern R., 161 U. S. 646, 660 (1896).
6 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 4 at 533.
7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §3656 (perm. ed.
1933). The New York State amending clause is contained in N. Y. COrST.
Art. X, § 1, and N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 5.
[ VOL. 24
NOTES AND COMMENT
reservation is not repugnant to the grant, but is a valid limitation on
the powers and privileges granted." 8
The nature of a corporate charter as a contract within the pro-
tection of state and federal constitutional provisions embraces not
only the relations of the corporation and the state, but the obliga-
tions of the corporation to the stockholders as well.9 "The certificate
of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's title and evidence of his
right. It expresses the contract between the corporation . ..and
himself." 10
II
Regarding the contractual rights of the shareholder as against
the corporation, we are here concerned with the power of a corpora-
tion to change the terms of its obligations to the stockholders by
virtue of statutory authority.
The power of the state to alter or amend a corporate charter
may be delegated to the corporation by appropriate statutory enact-
ment.' The ultimate test as to the validity of such statutes depends
upon whether the change can be said to come within the reserved
power of the legislature to alter or amend the corporate charter.12
In turn, the applicability of the reserved power has been supposed by
many courts to be determined by the nature of the "right" of the
stockholder that the corporation proposes to alter. Certain rights,
it was thought, were constitutionally vested against change; and as
to them the legislature could not exercise its reserved power to alter
or amend the corporate charter or certificate. By extension, where
the vested right was not subject to change by the state, the legis-
lature could not enact a statute authorizing such change at the dis-
cretion of the corporation itself.
Professor Ballantine submits that the doctrine of vested rights
in relation to shareholders' contracts is an illusory one. "Some...
rights ... have been supposed [to have] the peculiar sanctity to be
vested and so to be immune from the power of amendment." 13 The
8 13 Am. JUR., Corporations § 90.9 Breslav v. New York and Queens Electric Light and Power Co., 249
App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N. Y. 593,
7 N. E. 2d 708 (1937) ; McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 839, 54
N. Y. S. 2d 253, 258 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
20 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 180 (1879).
11 "It is well settled that any change or alteration the legislature might
make by direct act may be made by delegating to the corporation, or a ma-
jority or some other percentage of its stockholders the power to do so."
Breslav v. N. Y. & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181,
184, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, 935 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N. Y. 593, 7 N. E.
2d 708 (1937).2 Hinkley v. Schwartzchild & Sultzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 473,
95 N. Y. Supp. 357, 360 (1st Dep't 1905).
23 BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs § 277 (2d ed. 1946).
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cases referred to immediately hereafter are mentioned to emphasize,
in comparison with the material treated in Section III of this article,
the shift in attitude concerning the vested rights doctrine. To Mr.
Justice Cardozo the term vested right was a "deceptive label" in con-
nection with this problem. To the court, in McNulty v. W. & J.
Sloane,1 4 "vested right" was indeed a term, ".. . which had not been
clearly defined in the cases. Whenever the court was of the opinion
that certain rights of stockholders could not be interfered with, they
characterized those rights as 'vested.'"
For example, in Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co.,1 5 the New York
Court of Appeals declared that a corporation could not eliminate ac-
crued dividends on preferred stock through the procedure of a reduc-
tion of capital stock. The ". . . valid contract between the company
and the preferred stockholders . . ." created rights in the stockholder
which were "inviolable." 16 The court based its decision not alone
on the absence of any specific statutory power to do this but indi-
cated that the right to accumulated dividends was a vested right.
17
The leading New York case of Lord v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society of America 18 has been cited for the proposition that
an amendment which deprived the stockholders of the right to vote
for all the directors was invalid. It was held that ". . . the right
of a stockholder to vote for directors is property and he cannot be
deprived of it without his consent." 19
In Breslav v. New York and Queens Electric Light and Power
Co.,20 it was held that a statute authorizing a corporation to "classify"
or "reclassify" any shares by a vote of the holders of two-thirds of
the outstanding stock did not authorize an amendment making non-
callable preferred stock callable. The stockholder's interest in a cor-
poration as a holder of non-callable stock was a vested interest. It
was not a defeasable right subject to be extinguished by a majority
vote. Speaking of the reserved power of amendment the court said:
"... its exercise is subject to the restrictions and restraints imposed
by the other provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. Due
process of law must be observed, and vested property rights and the
obligations of contracts must not be destroyed or impaired." 21
In Hoyt v. Great American Ins. Co.,22 it was held that stock-
holders, in the absence of laches or acquiescence, have a vested right
14 184 Misc. 835, 841, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
15 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906).
l6 Id. at 263, 77 N. E. at 15.
17 Accord: Wiedersum v. Atlantic Cement Products, Inc., 261 App. Div.
305, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 496 (2d Dep't 1941) ; Lonesdale Securities Corp. v. Inter-
national Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 554, 139 AtI. 50 (Ch. 1927).
is 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (1909).
19 Id. at 239, 87 N. E. at 453.
20 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936).
21 Id. at 185, 291 N. Y. Supp. at 937.
22201 App. Div. 352, 194 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dep't 1922).
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to take their proportionate share of an increase in the capital stock.
This preemptive right, it was said, is not statutory but rests upon
principles of the conmmon law.
In Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.'23 the defendant
corporation had provided in its charter that it would create a sinking
fund for the future redemption of preferred stock. The corporation
attempted to eliminate the sinking fund obligation. The court held
that the sinking fund stipulation created a contractual right "... . more
fully answering the requirements of a vested right than did an ex-
pectancy of future payments of undeclared dividends." 24
In Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works,25 plaintiff had bought 100
shares of preferred stock, the certificate of which contained the fol-
lowing provision: "This stock is subject to redemption and shall
be redeemed at par on January 25, 1932. . . ." The action was pre-
cipitated because of the corporation's refusal to redeem the stock
on the named day. The defense was based upon an amendment to
defendant's articles of incorporation in consequence of which the cor-
poration claimed the redemption date of plaintiff's stock had been
extended to January 25, 1957. The court held that plaintiff's right
to redeem the stock on a named date was a definite contractual under-
taking; and hence a corporation could not, under constitutional pro-
visions relating to the reserved power over the corporation, change
the redemption date of the stock.
III
In a relatively short period of time the law relating to amend-
ment of corporate charters has changed considerably. In 1937, the
date of the Breslav case, the law authorizing a corporation to amend
its charter was to be found in Section 36 of the Stock Corporation
Law. Paragraph G of the section authorized the corporation to
". .. classify or reclassify any shares." It will be recalled that the
decision turned on the refusal of the court to construe the legislative
authority to reclassify shares as a right to make non-callable stock
callable. The court said the vested rights doctrine did not admit of
such construction.
In 1941, however, the Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision
took a long step forward in the direction of nullifying the vested
rights approach. Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscombe, Inc.,26
though it held that preferred holders could not be deprived of their
rights in accumulated dividends and in a cumulative sinking fund for
23 34 F. 2d 533 (D. C. R. I. 1929), cited with approval in Breslav v. New
York and Queens Electric Light and Power Co., supra note 10, and Davison
v. Parke, Austin & Lipscombe, Inc., 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. 2d 618 (1941).
24 Id. at 554.
25276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815 (1935).
26285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. 2d 618 (1941).
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the redemption of their stock, pointed out that the vested right issue
was not material to the problem. There it was said in relation to
the alteration of stockholders' rights by less than a unanimous vote
of the stockholders that, "The judicial problem is not whether a par-
ticular preferential right is vested or not, but rather what was the
legislative intent as to it." 27 The plaintiff prevailed in this case be-
cause the court found no specific authority in Section 36 to make
the amendment in question. Implicit in the above quotation, how-
ever, is the view that the legislature did have the power to authorize
an amendment touching on the so-called vested right of a shareholder.
Courts were quick to adopt the step forward that the Davison
case had taken. In Longson v. Beaux Arts Apartments,28 the appel-
late division and the Court of Appeals relied upon the reasoning in
the Davison case. Both courts approved of the statement in the
Davison case that: "The inadequacy of the vested rights test is fur-
ther demonstrated by the fact that new stock may be issued with
preferential rights to the assets of the corporation upon dissolution
and to dividends superior to the preferential rights of the then out-
standing shares . ..29 even superior to the right of preferred stock-
holders to dividends in arrears .... , 30
The call to the legislature, as made in the Davison case, to spe-
cify more definitely the changes that a corporation could make was
not left unanswered. In 1943 the section was amended. The hold-
ings in the Breslav and Davison cases were made obsolete. The
paragraph authorizing reclassification in general terms was made
more explicit.3 '
27 Id. at 509, 35 N. E. at 622.
28265 App. Div. 951, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 605 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 290 N. Y.
845, 50 N. E. 2d 240 (1943).
29 Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179.30 Matter of Duer, 270 N. Y. 343, 1 N. E. 2d 457. The quotation from
the principal case is found in 285 N. Y. at 509, 35 N. E. at 622. It is inter-
esting to note in both the Dresser and Duer cases, that the complaining stock-
holders were not seeking a preservation of their preferences, and therefore the
vested rights issue was never raised. The importance of the Davison case in
this regard therefore lies in its interpretation of Matter of Diter and iatter
of Dresser as two cases weakening the vested rights viev.
31 The section read as follows: "Section 36. Changes in respect to shares,
capital stock or capital; . . .(E) To classify or reclassify any shares whether
with or without par value the creation, alteration or abolition, in whole or in
part, of designations, preferences, privileges or voting powers of any shares
previously authorized, or the restrictions or qualifications thereof (includingthe creation, alteration or abolition of any provisions or rights in respect of
(a) the redemption of any shares, or (b) any cumulative or non-cumulative
dividends, whether or not accrued, which shall have not been declared, or
(c) any accumulated but unexpended installment of any sinking fund whether
or not set aside for the redemption or purchase of any shares, or (d) any
preemptive right to subscribe for shares or other securities of the corporation
whether existing at law or contained in the certificate of incorporation or other
certificate filed pursuant to law), shall be deemed to be a classification or re-
classification of such shares for the purpose of this section. . . ." This sec-
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In defining the term "reclassify" it eliminated all conjecture as
to whether or not the six vested rights outlined above were subject
to change, at least prospectively.
Still in 1943 the influence of the vested rights view had not
subsided. The appellate division used this type of reasoning in
Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage Corporation.3 2  The litigation
arose out of the demand of plaintiff for distribution of a surplus cre-
ated by a reduction of the capital stock of defendant corporation
pursuant to Section 36(G) (15) of the Stock Corporation Law as
amended in 1939.33 The corporation maintained that the surplus
thus realized could be legally transferred to the surplus account, re-
lying on the very section under which it acted.34 The court held,
however, that the statute could have no retroactive effect. And,
since the class of stock had been issued before the amendment of the
statute, plaintiff's right to a pro-rata share of the surplus was,
".. fixed, vested, and inviolable. . . ,, :35
The ruling of the appellate division was reversed, but not on
the ground that the statute operated retroactively. 36 This decision
then seemed to leave open the question as to whether the legislature
had the constitutional power to amend Section 35 effectively, so as
to eliminate pre-existent rights which the courts had held vested and
beyond the reach of the law-making body.
Finally in 1945 the issue was squarely presented in a New York
trial court. The decision is the now famous McNulty v. W. & J.
Sloane.3 7 The issues there to be decided were (1) did the legisla-
ture have the power to authorize by a vote of the holders of two-
thirds of each class of stock, an amendment to a certificate of in-
corporation which the courts had previously held not subject to
change; (2) assuming such constitutional power, would the statute
tion may now be found in N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 35(3) as rewritten and
renumbered in 1949.
32265 App. Div. 622, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 391 (1st Dep't 1943).33 Now N. Y. SrcC Corp. LAW § 36(4) (c).
34 This section now reads: "If it is proposed to reduce capital, the cer-
tificate shall . . . (c) provide that the surplus if any, shall be used for the
following purposes: (1) to be used for any purpose for which. surplus may
be used; or (2) to be reserved and used for specified purposes; or (3) to be
returned to the stockholders, according to their respective rights, at the times
and in the manner specified."35Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage Corp., 265 App. Div. 622, 629,
40 N. Y. S. 2d 391, 399 (1st Dep't 1943).
36291 N. Y. 227, 52 N. E. 2d 108 (1943). An historical analysis of New
York statutes, dating back to 1897, regarding the disposition of reduction sur-
plus led the court to conclude, ". . . that from the year 1901 to the present
time no distribution of a surplus created by reduction of capital of a stock
corporation has been required by the law of New York." The 1939 amend-
ment, therefore, was ". . . in essence what had been the law from a time long
antecedent to the organization of the corporate defendant in 1926." Id. at
234, 52 N. E. 2d at 110.
37 184 Misc. 835, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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allow elimination of undeclared cumulative dividends which have ac-
crued before its enactment? The court answered both of these ques-
tions in the affirmative with the decision definitely destroying the old
vested rights concept. In 1946 the Court of Appeals approved the
McNulty case.38 It has since then been cited with approval by the
appellate division 30 and in two lower court opinions. 40 The court
in one case saying, "The extent of the legislative power is portrayed
clearly in the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Shientag in McNulty
v. W. & J. Sloane... ,, 41
IV
It has been seen that in New York the legislative and judicial
policy has been toward giving the corporation greater flexibility, by
permitting basic and numerous changes in the "contract" between the
shareholder and the corporation. The resulting liberality could only
have been, and was, achieved by reasoning that the minority share-
holder does not have any constitutionally vested rights which are
beyond the reach of the legislature.
But this policy does not mean that the minority shareholder is
at the mercy of the majority shareholder, for he does have certain
rights. The minority stockholder may apply to courts of equity for
aid. The general rule is that a court of equity will enjoin the ma-jority from amending a certificate only where fraud or bad faith is
shown on the part of the majority. 42  Where, however, no fraud or
bad faith is shown the plaintiff will be remitted to his right of ap-
praisal, for in such case his remedy at law would be adequate. 43  A
's Anderson v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N. Y. 343,
67 N. E. 2d 593 (1946).
39 Leibschutz v. Schaffer Stores Co., Inc., 274 App. Div. 847, 80 N. Y. S.
2d 771 (4th Dep't 1948).
40 Arstein et al. v. Robert Reis & Co., 77 N. Y. S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Beloff et al. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 440(Sup. Ct. 1948).
41 Beloff et al. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., supra note 40 at
442.
42 McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 844-5, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253,
258 (Sup. Ct. 1945); the court here saying: "There also exists the inherent
power of a court of equity, a power limited generally to the test of good faith
rather than a test objective in character, a power the exercise of which may
be circumscribed, because too often what is an accomplished fact is presented
to the court; but it is a significant, restraining influence nevertheless." See
also Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 182 Misc. 323, 328, 44 N. Y. S. 2d
33, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; where the court said: "True the plaintiffs say the
plan is so unfair to the preferred stockholders, in favor of the common stock-
holders, that it amounts to fraud, but, . . .that is . . .nothing more than an
emphatic way of saying that as a matter of business judgment plaintiffs would
rather keep what they now have. No actual bad faith is shown, and neither
is there such unfairness, if any as would justify an inference of fraud."
43 Wilson v. Waltham Watch Co., 293 Fed. 811 (D. C. Mass. 1923); Skelly
v. Dockweiler, 75 F. Supp. 11 (S. D. Cal. 1947)-the latter case citing many
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stockholder is'also permitted an action in equity to have the amenda-
tory certificate cancelled where he was not given proper notice,44
for the procedure provided for by the statute in amending the cer-
tificate is mandatory.45 But the stockholder may by laches, estoppel
or waiver surrender his rights to equitable relief.46
The second and by far the most important remedy that the dis-
senting shareholder has is his right of appraisal. The governing
New York statute 47 makes provision for a majority 48 of share-
holders to amend the certificate of incorporation so as to alter or
abolish preferences and voting rights of shares.49  When such ac-
tion is taken, to protect objecting minority shareholders, 50 provision
is made for the appraisal of their shares.5 1 It is settled that the right
of appraisal is absolute and cannot be denied notwithstanding the
fact that a shareholder has a negligible amount of shares, which could
readily be sold in the open market, or that he is acting in bad faith,
so long as there is compliance with the conditions set forth by the
legislature.
52
cases. See Notes, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 81 (1948) and 15 U. oF CHi. L. REv.
225 (1947), which treat the problem of whether the right of appraisal is an
adequate remedy. A factual study of the inadequacies of the statutory right
of appraisal can be found in the SEC REPORT ON REORGANIZATION CoM-
mi=-rsEs, Part VIII, 590 et seq. (1938).
44 See N. Y. STOCK CORp. LAW § 37(1) (C) (4) and § 45.
45 Danzig v. Lacks, 235 App. Div. 189, 256 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1932);
N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 36-38.
46 Davison v. Parke, Austin and Lipscombe, Inc., 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E.
2d 617 (1941).
47 N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW §§ 35-38.
4N N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 37(1) (3) requires a vote of the holders of
record of two-thirds of the outstanding shares which are adversely affected
and are entitled to vote.
49 N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 35(2) (c) and (3).
5o In re Eaton, 189 Misc. 303, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1947); see
also Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes,
45 HARv. L. REv. 233 (1931) ; and Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amend-
ments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 585 (1927).
51 N. Y. SToCK CORP. LAW § 38(11). Providing that where the amenda-
tory certificate alters or abolishes any preferential rights; creates, alters or
abolishes rights to redemption of shares; or provisions for sinking funds; or
limits or denies or abolishes preemptive rights, any holder adversely affected
may object and demand payment for his stock. The statute does not require
that the shareholder demand that the corporation abandon the proposed amend-
ment before he may exercise his right of appraisal. See in conjunction with
this section, N. Y. STOcK CORP. LAw § 21.
52Matter of Marcus (Macy & Co.), 279 N. Y. 38, 74 N. E. 2d 228
(1947). But cf. Matter of Leventhall, 241 App. Div. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp.
493 (1st Dep't 1934), where the court held good faith to be material when
the stockholder became such after notice had been sent of the proposed change
for the purpose of obtaining approval by the holders of record. That the
right of appraisal is not limited to stockholders of record, see Application of
Bazar 183 Misc. 736, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Matter of Rowe,
107 Visc. 549, 176 N. Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
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The New York courts have distinguished between amendments
to the charter which allow the issuance of new shares of stock hav-
ing preferences and altering preferential rights in outstanding
shares.53  Hence, it has been held that an amendment which per-
mitted a new and previously unauthorized issue of stock, did not
of itself give a stockholder a right of appraisal within the meaning
of the statute.54 Relief was denied even though the value of the
previously outstanding shares was lowered as where a new issue of
preferred was to have preference over the old preferred stock.
55
Therefore ". . . the alteration, if any, must be as between the pref-
erences of the existing stock in relation to each other and not as
between the existing stocks and the stock proposed to be issued." 56
if the shareholder is to have the right of appraisal. This view was
affirmed by the later statutory amendment.57 However, because of
the shareholders' preemptive rights 58 allowing him to maintain pro-
portionate control in the corporation, there seems to be no need for
affording the right of appraisal as against new shares.59
As to other amendments to the corporate charter, for example,
in regard to voting rights, the courts do not seem to limit the right
of appraisal to alteration of rights inter se,60 mainly because the stat-
ute uses differing terminology,0 ' and, as has been seen, these cases
pertaining to the right of appraisal hinge upon the wording of the
statute; the right being a purely statutory one.
62
5 Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928).
54 Matter of Kinney, 279 N. Y. 423, 18 N. E. 2d 645 (1939).
55 In referring to Matter of Dresser, supra note 52, where appraisal was
refused the court stated that ". . . the value of the old stock may have been
affected, [but] the preferential rights remained the same, subject only to the
preferences of the new class." Matter of Kinney, 279 N. Y. 423, 428, 18 N. E.
2d 645, 648 (1939).
56 Application of Woodruff, 175 Misc. 819, 821, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 679, 680
(Sup. Ct. 1941). That the right of appraisal only exists where preferences
are changed as between the shareholders inter se, see also Matter of Silber-
kraus, 250 N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929); In re Gohn, 174 Misc. 188, 20
N. Y. S. 2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1940); holding that the superimposing of a new
class of stock upon existing classes does not in and of itself give the right of
appraisal; but where new preferred stock is issued in exchange for the old.
the new stock eliminating the right to accrued dividends, cutting the rate of
return from two dollars to one dollar per share, a right of appraisal existed.
57 Formerly N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 38(9) (d) and now § (35) (11) (a).
58 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 39.
59 Matter of Dresser, szpra note 52; Matter of Silberkraus, 250 N. Y. 242,
165 N. E. 279 (1929); see also Albrecht v. General Plastics, 280 N. Y. 840,
21 N. E. 2d 887 (1939). Quaere, as the new preemptive statute was passed
after these cases, and limiting preemptive rights to (a) voting shares acquir-
ing proportionate share of new voting shares, (b) unlimited dividend paying
shares acquiring share of the new dividend shares, could not the corporation
avoid the preemptive statute by creating new preferred shares which are not
subject to the stockholders preemptive rights?
60 See Matter of Marcus (Macy & Co.), 297 N. Y. 38, 74 N. E. 2d 228
(1947).
61 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 38(11). But see subd. (6).
62 See 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA1rONS § 5906 (rev. ed. 1932).
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Conclu sion
If the corporation could not change its structure by amending
its certificate, it could resort only to dissolution. Today, as we have
seen, flexibility in the corporation's capital structure has replaced the
static vested rights concept of the past. There may be, and have
been, abuses by the majority toward the few; but, to a large extent,
they have been minimized by giving the dissenter: (1) the right of
appraisal, and (2) access to courts of equity in certain instances.
Still, the minority stockholder may not be amply protected. In the
McNulty case the court recognized such difficulty, but said that:
"The problem was one of balancing intertwining and conflicting in-
terests and of determining what was conducive to the good of
society." 63 This the legislature has determined.
JOSEPH W. CAMPANELLA,
JOSEPH M. NANRIN.
THE VALIDITY OF THE 1945 AMENDMENT TO SECTIoN 52
OF THE NEW YORK VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW
Although the invention of the automobile has been instrumental
in bringing about the high standard of living that exists in America
today, nevertheless, it has created serious problems that counteract
this good. Although the gravest of these are in the social field, per-
plexing problems have arisen in the legal field as well. The everyday
use of the automobile, in which the crossing of state lines is continu-
ous and commonplace, has made our concept of statewide jurisdiction
cumbersome, if not impossible. The prime instance of this is the
difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over a non-resident motorist, the
tort-feasor in an accident, so that he can be forced to account for the
damage done to the person and property of a resident.
Originally the only manner of obtaining jurisdiction over the
non-resident was through service of a summons on him while he was
temporarily in the state. This was inadequate, though, for the non-
resident left the state as soon after the accident as he could; and he
made sure that he did not return while there was any possibility of
action being brought against him. Of course the injured party could
always bring the action in the state of the non-resident; but this was
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